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ABSTRACT

Over eight million new and existing homes are sold each year, while every seller
has a similar objective; to simultaneously maximize sales price and minimize the
duration the home is on the market. There is no predetermined manner in which to select
how long one should list the property with a broker, if the seller decides to not sell the
property themselves, or how long a broker will need to sell the property. Numerous
studies have been conducted to examine variousfactors affecting days on market (DOM),
while no research has been conducted on the effect length of contract (LOC) has on
DOM

This research uses two-stage least squares regression to examine how LOC

impacts DOM
INTRODUCTION

If we believe the Real Estate market is efficient, regardless of contract length, an
overpriced home may not sell. Logically, it would seem that the more overpriced the
property, the longer it will take for that property to sell, if it sells at all. With this in
mind, a real estate broker should be hesitant to list an overpriced home and put resources
into the sale because of the lowered probability the property will sell. However, a real
estate broker may be willing to accept an overpriced listing if the seller is willing to agree
to a longer listing contract.
For example, if a broker agrees to sell an overpriced home on a 90 day contract
and the property does not sell, the seller will likely feel the home did not sell because of
factors other than the property being overpriced. But, if the broker gets the seller to agree
to a 360 day contract, the seller is more likely to realize the house is overpriced based on
limited offers in the market and therefore lower the sales price.
Also, if two houses with similar amenities and characteristics are both on the
market, it is hypothesized the house with the least amount of time left on the contract will
be more heavily marketed by the broker.
In a theoretical paper, Miceli (1989) proposes that a shorter listing contract is
motivation for a broker to sell the house quicker. However, the seller needs to ensure a
realistic time is allotted for the house to sell or otherwise the seller must spend time and
money to negotiate another listing contract. Most brokers have a general idea of how

I~111111111~~~]~~1
lllli~~~[l~i
1111
~II
1000422277

2

overpriced a property is before they agree to the listing and a rough estimate of how long
it will take the property to sell.
With all of this in mind, is the LOC affected by the anticipated DOM and how
much the property is overpriced? If LOC is a function of DOM and OP, along with other
variables, how much of an impact do DOM and OP have on LOC?
LITERATURE REVIEW

Numerous studies have examined various single factors that affect DOM. These
studies are rich with data but are inconsistent in many cases. Authors have suggested
agent experience, the amount a home is overpriced, atypicality of a home, and home
vacancy, just to name a few, all effect the number of days a house is on the market
(DOM).
Ellis and Waller (2005) find experience of the listing agent is not significant and
that larger brokerage firms have no advantage. However, they do find the experience of
the selling agent is statistically significant and may lower DOM. Research by Jud, Seaks,
and Winkler (1996) contradict these findings and find there is no evidence that particular
agents or firms are able to reduce DOM. They find houses with lower list prices,
downward changes in list prices, and less atypical homes all have shorter DOM.
Haurin (1988), Larsen and Park (1989) and Sirmans, Turnbull and Benjamin
(1991) all find larger brokerage firms effectively reduce DOM compared to their smaller
competitors. In opposition, Yang and Yavas (1995) find there is no impact on DOM
when it comes to a brokerage firm's size, while Robinson and Waller (2005) find smaller
firms may reduce DOM in atypical homes.
While many studies have looked at various factors that affect DOM, very few
have looked at the simultaneous nature of DOM, length of contract (LOC), and the
amount the house is overpriced (OP).
Kang and Gardner (1989) findings suggest overpriced homes take longer time to
sell, regardless of general market conditions. They conclude that both overpriced and
older homes take longer to sell no matter what the market conditions.
Benjamin and Chinloy (2000) find market- or below-market priced houses benefit
from greater listing broker activity and sell faster while above- market prices properties
experience longer time on the market.
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Knight (2002) finds the two most important determinates of price revision are the
total length of time the home is marketed and the amount by which the home is initially
overpriced.
Some differentiating points in the above studies as compared to this study include
the time frame and size of the data set. Sirmans, Turnbull and Benjamin (1991) findings
are based on a southern metropolitan area and the data covers the time period 1985-1987.
Yavas and Yang (1995) and Yang and Yavas (1995) utilizes a data set of 270 and 388
properties respectively and in both situations are drawn from the same college town with
a population of approximately 45,000 in 1991. Haurin's (1988) data set consists of only
219 observations drawn from a metropolitan area covering the time period 1976-1977.
Although Robinson and Waller's (2005) findings are based on a large and current data set
(4,572 properties from 1995-2005), they strongly focus on atypical "lake" properties. In
each of the above studies, the findings may be market specific or not adequately explored
due to small data sets.
METHODOLOGY

To thoroughly study the questions above, the following hypotheses are examined.
Hypotheses:

Hl: LOC = f(POP, X)
H2: DOM= f(LOC)
H3: Brokers push and sell properties close to the conclusion of the contract
To test the above hypotheses, two-stage least squares regression analyses and
analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques were employed.
X is a vector of other variables including housing and economic variables. These
include housing statistics like number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and lot size.
Two-Stage Least Squares

DOM and LOC are believed to be simultaneously determined, therefore the need
for two-stage least squares.
Traditional Ordinary Least Squares cannot be used in this study because it
violates the assumption of recursivity. The recursivity assumption says that the model
will not involve any feedback loops. LOC creates a problematic causal variables for the
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DOM regression.

LOC, the disturbance term, is posited to be correlated with the

disturbance term of another endogenous variable on which it has a direct effect.
As a result of this violation of OLS, we must use a regression technique called
two-stage least squares. Two-stage least squares does not violate the assumption of
recursivity. The two stages in two-stage least squares refers to (1) a stage in which new
dependent or endogenous variables are created to substitute for the original
simultaneously determined variable, and (2) a stage in which the regression is computed
in the traditional ordinary least squares manner, but using the newly created variables. In
using two-stage least squares and the use of the first stage, we have created new
dependent variables that do not violate ordinary least squares regression's recursivity
assumption.
We will use instruments, which are variables used in the first stage of two-stage
least squares, to create the new variables, called instrumental variables, which will
replace the problematic causal variables. This can be accomplished by using OLS
regression. An OLS regression is run with the instrumental variables as the independent
variables and the problematic causal variable as the dependent variable. The instruments
are the exogenous variables with direct or indirect causal paths to the problematic causal
variable but which have no direct causal path to the endogenous variable whose
disturbance term is correlated with that of the problematic causal variable.

This

regression equation produces a set of predicted values, which are the values of the new
causal variable, and replace the problematic causal variable.
This leads us into the second stage of the two-stage least squares regression. We
now have a new variable which is uncorrelated to the disturbance term of the endogenous
variable. With this replacement done for all the problematic causal variables, we will no
longer be violating the recursivity assumption. We are now able to run a simple OLS
regression using the newly created instrumental variables.
We have made several assumptions in using two-stage least squares. The first
assumption is that the model is correctly specified with the relationships being
homoscedastic (error variance being similar for the range of the response variables), and
that the error terms are normally distributed. The other assumptions for two-stage least
squares are the same as a normal OLS regression.
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In mathematical terms, a traditional model is as follows:
y=Xb+e
In this model, y is a T x 1 vector of dependent variables, X is a T x k matrix of
independent variables, b is a k x 1 vector of parameters to estimate, and e is a k x 1 vector
of errors. However, the matrix of independent variables X cannot be correlated to the e's.
We can then use a matrix of independent variables Z, uncorrelated to the e's, that is T x r,
where r>k to run two-stage least squares as follows:
Stage 1: Using OLS, regress the X's on the Z's to get Xhat = (Z1X)-lZ 1y
Stage 2: By OLS, regress yon the Xhat's. This gives an unbiased estimate ofb.
The two-stages can be combined into one stage:
b = (X'PzX)-1X'Pzy
Pz, the projection matrix of Z, is defined as:
Pz = Z(Z'Z)-lZ'

THE DATA

The data set for this paper was extrapolated from the Roanoke Valley Multiple
Listing Service (MLS). The data was limited to properties that had already been sold.
Originally, the data set consisted of 4,640 properties, which included 1,162 waterfront
lake properties.

However, due to incomplete data, 876 observations were removed,

leaving 3,764 properties to be included in the analyses. The properties were listed
between April 1995 and September 2004.
The properties to be included in this study had an average days on market (DOM)
of 111 days, with an average length of contract (LOC) of 224 days. The overpriced
variable (OP) was derived by subtracting the sales price from the original listing price.
The average property was overpriced by $6,501 or 31% (POP). The average house was
on the market for a total of 157 days (TOTTIME).
The average property had 3.34 acres of property, 3 bedrooms (BR), 2 bathrooms
(FBATH), and had square footage (SQFT) of2,025. There was an average of 45.3 feet of
water front property (WFT). The average year built (YRB) of the homes was 1983. The
average listing price (LP) before sale was $200,372, and the average sales price (SP) was
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$193,871. 31.5% of houses were listed in the spring, 27.2% were listed in the summer,
20.9% were listed in the fall, and 20.4% were listed in the winter.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables
Mean
Std. Dev. Minimum
Maximum
DOM
124.15
1.00
111.17
1380
LOC
224.29
125.81
28
1464
OP
6501.19 11421.71
-46000
95000
POP
0.316
0.055
-0.36
0.555
TOTTIME
129.24
156.99
5
1519
ACR
13.02
0.06
3.34
638
BR
0.67
1
3.09
7
FBATH
2.12
0.72
1
6
SOFT
2024.76
902.85
480
7156
WFT
45.27
108.52
0
1600
YRB
1983
22.15
1800
2004
LP
200372.3 153423.6
10000 1750000
SP
193871.1 148214.3
7500
1700000
RESULTS

The first stage of the two stage least squares regression process are shown in
Table 2, where length of the listing contract (LOC) is regressed on a vector of 10
independent variables include the following; percentage overpriced (POP), lot size
(ACR), square footage, age, number of bedrooms (BED), number of bathrooms (BATH),
amount of waterfront property (WTR), along with three dummy variable representing the
seasons of Spring, Summer and Fall. The first stage of the TSLS results is significant at
the .01 level, with seven of the independent variables being significant at the .01 level.
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LOC
(constant)
POP
ACR
SQFT
AGE
BR
FBATH
WFT
SPRING
SUMMER
FALL

Table 2 : F'1rst Sta2e RCl ress10n R esu I ts
F
Adjusted R-squared
14.16
.034
Std. Err.
t
Coef.
17.17
11.23
192.82
2.65
37.13
98.27
.31
.156
.048
5.71
.018
.003
-2.94
.0989
-.29
3.626
-1.03
-3.745
-.84
-3.42
4.06
5.28
.0196
.103
1.04
5.74
5.99
2.87
5.92
16.98
6.27
3.76
23.61

Sig.
0.000
Sig
.0000
.0008
.757
.000
.003
.302
.000
.000
.297
.004
.000

The POP variable is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that
the larger the percentage of overpricing, the more likely that a realtor will request to
increase the length of the listing contract. This suggests that for every one percent that a
property is overpriced, the listing contract will increase by approximately one day. While
this is theoretically the situation, it is not likely to be the actual case since most listing
contracts are increased in monthly increments, with many brokers only willing to accept a
minimum of a six month listing contract. This is empirically illustrated in this data set as
six month listing contracts represent more than 50% of those in the data set.
The hypothesized model suggests that as the lot size of the listed properties
increase so will the listing contract. This theory is based on the assertion that larger
properties will be more expensive and holding all else constant will require a longer
marketing time in order for supply and demand to reach its equilibrium. Although lot
size (ACR) is positive as hypothesized, it is not significant at conventional levels. Based
on similar logic, the size of the listed property is expected to have a positive impact on
the length of the listing contract. This implies that a larger property, as determined by
square footage (SQFT), will likely take the listing broker additional time to market the
property adequately to qualified buyers and therefore will be resolute on an extended
listing contract. The SQFT coefficient in the first stage results is positive and significant
at the 1 percent level. The SQFT coefficient of .018 indicates that a 2,000 square foot
home will call for a listing contract of 36 days holding all else constant. Analogously,
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the number of bedrooms and bathrooms were expected to have a positive affect on the
length of the listing contract. Although the BED coefficient is not significant, it is
negative.

Likewise, the number of bathrooms (BATH) coefficient is also negative,

however, is significant at the one percent level, signifying that each additional bathroom
will lessen the listing contract by approximately 3.42 days. Because the average number
of bathrooms in the data is just over 2, additional bathrooms above the average will likely
play a small and insignificant role in the listing agents request as to the LOC. However,
it is obvious that a property that has functional obsolescence due to too few bathrooms
relative to the number of bedrooms will impact the agent's decision due to the likelihood
for needed additional marketing time. Water front properties (WFT) in this data set are
primarily located in a resort/vacation area and their existence are expected to increase the
LOC to compensate for the limited number of qualified buyers. It may also be reasonable
to speculate that due to the fact that such properties carry, on average, a substantially
higher asking price and therefore are more valuable to the listing agent than non-water
front properties.
The AGE variable is negative and significant indicating that an agent listing an
older property will not give age too much consideration, if any, in requesting listing
contract length. The estimated AGE coefficient of -.29 proposes that a ten year old
property will impact the listing contract by only 2.9 days, which would likely be
considered insignificant.
The seasons, SPRING, SUMMER and FALL were included in the first stage
regressions and were expected to be negative, positive and positive respectively. The
estimated SPRING coefficient is positive, but not significant at conventional levels,
however the estimated coefficients for SUMMER (16.98) and FALL (23.61) are both
significant at the one percent level.

This suggests that listing contract will be

approximately 17 and 24 days longer in the summer and fall respectively.
The second stage of the TSLS results, summarized in Table 3 below, indicates
that LOC is positive and significant at the one percent level. The estimated LOC
coefficient of 0.94 posits that length of listing contracts does positively impact the length
of time that a property will be on the market for sale. Interestingly enough, the LOC
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relationship to DOM is very close to a one-to-one relationship. This implies that the
length of the listing contract largely determines the time a property stays on the market.
The close one-to-one relationship found between LOC and DOM supports the
hypothesis that many sales are made close to the end of the contract.
Table 3: Second Stage Regression Results
Adjusted R-squared
F
.6666
372.55
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
-9.03
-98.76
10.94
.048
19.3
0.936

DOM
(constant)
LOC

Sig.
0.000
Sig
0.000
0.000

In fact, DOM and LOC have a correlation of 0.84, as summarized in Table 4.

Table 4: Correlations

DOM LOC
DOM
LOC
POP
YRB

SPRING

1

.826**
.118**
.074**
-.034*

.826**
1
.046**
.057**
-.026

POP
.118**
.046**
1
-.13**
-.013

YRB
.074**
.057**
-.13**
1
.000

SPRING SUMMER FALL SQFT WFT FBATH
-.034*
-.026
-.013
.000
1

.006
.032
-.004
.006
-.414**

.063**
.046**
.01
0.008

-

.127**
.141**
.030
.095**
.019

.084**
.127**
.052**
.078**
.019

.079**
.094**
-.018
.321 **
.013

.027

.025

.015

-.020

-.022
.284**
1
.237**

-.011
.642**
.237**
1

.349**

SUMMER .006
FALL
SQFT
WFT
FBATH

.063**
.127**
.085**
.079**

.032
.046**
.141 **
.127**
.094**

-.004
.011
.030
.052**
-.018

.006
-.008
.095**
.078**
.321 **

-.414**
-.349**
.019
.019
.013

1

-

-.315**
.027
.025
.015

.315**
1
-.020
-.022
-.011

N=3 764

I *.

I
.284**
.652**

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

CONCLUSIONS

Over 8 million new and existing homes are sold each year on the real estate
market. The majority of those sales are through the use of a broker. While every sale is
unique and there are many factors to consider in the sale of one's home, every seller
wishes to maximize selling price while minimizing DOM.
Many theoretical and research papers have been written on various factors that
affect the DOM of a property. This paper employs the use of two-stage least squares to

determine the effect LOC has on DOM. TSLS is employed as a result of the simultaneity
in LOC and DOM.
In stage 1 of TSLS, our hypothesis that LOC was a function of POP and a vector
of housing characteristics was proved.

These results support the findings of the

hypothesis that DOM is a function of LOC, POP, and other housing characteristics was
support to Kang and Gardner's (1989) findings that the more overpriced a property is the
longer it takes to sell, no matter what the general market conditions.
In stage 2 of TSLS, we saw that DOM is very much a function of LOC. In fact,
there is almost a one-for-one relationship between the two factors.
This data also confirms our third hypothesis that if two houses with similar
amenities and characteristics are both on the market, the house with the least amount of
time left on the contract will be more heavily marketed by the broker is supported by the
close one-to-one relationship between DOM and LOC. The data points towards the fact
that many properties are sold in the closing days of the listing contract. Miceli's (1989)
theoretical proposition that a shorter listing contract is motivation for a broker to sell the
house quicker is supported by these findings.
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